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Trade War, PPE, and Race 
Ernesto Hernández-López* 
ABSTRACT 
Tariffs on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), such as face masks and gloves, 
weaken the American response to COVID. The United States has exacerbated PPE 
shortages with Section 301 tariffs on these goods, part of a trade war with China. This has 
a disparate impact felt by minority communities because of a series of health inequity 
harms. COVID’s racial disparity appears in virus exposure, virus susceptibility, and 
COVID treatments. This Article makes legal, policy, and race-and-health arguments. 
Congress has delegated to the United States Trade Representative expansive authority to 
increase tariffs. This has made PPE supplies casualties of the trade war. In political terms, 
the Trump administration prioritized increasing tariffs over public health readiness. 
Regarding race, PPE shortages exemplify the socioeconomic effects of trade policies and 
add to COVID’s racial disparities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]rade wars are good, and easy to win” 
—President Donald Trump, March 2, 20181
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Participants of the Business Law Scholars Roundtable organized by the Brooklyn Law School and 
American Society of International Law International Economic Law Groups, and Professors Deepa 
Badrinarayana, César García Hernández, and Olympia Duhart for comments on earlier drafts.  
1 Thomas Franck, Trump Doubles Down: ‘Trade Wars Are Good, and Easy to Win,’ CNBC (Mar. 2, 2018, 
10:32 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/02/trump-trade-wars-are-good-and-easy-to-win.html.  
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The federal government is “not a shipping clerk” 
—President Donald Trump commenting on face masks, PPE, and ventilators, March 19, 
20202 
 
In 2020, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) became a daily concern for millions 
of Americans, opening a window into the complex issues of global trade and virus 
protection. Worn to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (COVID) by the coronavirus,3 PPE 
includes face masks, gloves, and more.4 In January, the first COVID cases in the United 
States appeared.5 In March, the World Health Organization declared the virus outbreak a 
global pandemic, while the United States declared it a national emergency.6 These 
declarations ignited panicked searches for PPE, followed by realizations that American 
inventories were far from sufficient. These shortages reflect a global trade issue since most 
PPE is imported from overseas producers. This Article examines these developments in 
public health and these critically needed supplies. It also illustrates how American trade 
policies exacerbated PPE shortages and identifies the racial disparities experienced by 
those who need PPE.     
Because of a two-year trade war with China, PPE purchases were more expensive, if 
not impossible during the first few months of 2020.7 Starting in 2018, President Donald 
Trump imposed new tariffs for imports from China, including tariffs on PPE. Tariffs are 
taxes paid by importers when products enter the United States.8 As part of the trade war, 
 
2 Remarks at a White House Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 7 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202000174/pdf/DCPD-202000174.pdf. 
3 See Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus That Causes It, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-
coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last visited July 27, 2020). 
4 See AGATA DABROWSKA & VICTORIA R. GREEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11488, PERSONAL PROTECTIVE 
EQUIPMENT (PPE) AND COVID-19: FDA REGULATION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 1 (2020). 
5 See CDC COVID-19 Response Team, Michelle A. Jorden, Sarah L. Rudman, Elsa Villarino, Stacey 
Hoferka,  
Megan T. Patel, Kelley Bemis, Cristal R. Simmons, Megan Jespersen, Jenna Iberg Johnson, Elizabeth 
Mytty,  
Katherine D. Arends, Justin J. Henderson, Robert W. Mathes, Charlene X. Weng, Jeffrey Duchin, MD10; 
Jennifer Lenahan, Natasha Close, Trevor Bedford, Michael Boeckh, Helen Y. Chu, Janet A. Englund, 
Michael Famulare, Deborah A. Nickerson, Mark J. Rieder, Jay Shendure & Lea M. Starita, Evidence for 
Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States, January–February 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 680 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6922e1-H.pdf. 
6 The WHO declaration was on March 11. See Jamie Ducharme, World Health Organization Declares 
COVID-19 a 'Pandemic.' Here's What That Means, TIME (Mar. 11, 2020, 12:39 PM), 
https://time.com/5791661/who-coronavirus-pandemic-declaration/. On March 13 President Donald Trump 
declared a national emergency. See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 18, 2020).  
7 A trade war occurs when a state uses economic harm to persuade a foreign state to agree to change its 
trade policies, see c.f. Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SEC. 90, 94 (1997). 
The trade war with China includes a series of tariff actions. The first tariffs, for solar panels and washing 
machines, were imposed on January 22, 2018. For a timeline, see Chad P. Bown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s 
Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON., 
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf (last updated Sept. 28, 
2020). 
8 This essay also uses the terms levies, taxes, and duties to also refer to tariffs. For description of how 
tariffs are administered and who pays them, see Who Pays Trump’s Tariffs, China or U.S. Customer and 
Companies, REUTERS (May 21, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-
tariffs-explainer/who-pays-trumps-tariffs-china-or-u-s-customers-and-companies-idUSKCN1SR1UI. For 
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the United States deployed additional tariffs, levies of either 7.5% or 25% on goods from 
China,9 an important source of PPE imports. With these new tariffs, importers could pay 
up to 25% more just to have their PPE purchases enter the country.10 These tariffs are in 
addition to usual custom duties. The added expenses are passed on to distributors, retailers, 
and consumers.11 The administration did not approve requests in 2018 and 2019 to 
eliminate these tariffs for PPE.12 When the pandemic hit in 2020, PPE shortages added to 
the stress already caused by quarantines, social distancing, and general panic.13 PPE is used 
by a variety of actors, including for personal use and for large medical centers. PPE buyers 
faced many challenges. To limit exposure to the virus, Americans re-organized their home, 
work, and family lives. Because of this, they desperately looked for PPE. These scarcities 
weakened a national COVID response.14 These experiences show how a trade war impacts 
domestic consumers. Said simply, a trade war made PPE scarce and more expensive, just 
as the pandemic converted PPE into a life-or-death necessity for millions of Americans.   
This outbreak and the need for PPE critically impacts minority communities. African 
Americans and Latinos are three times more likely to be infected and are nearly twice as 
likely to die from COVID.15 The virus spreads more dangerously in these communities, 
with greater rates of contractions, hospitalizations, and deaths.16 Because of this, health 
officials worry about the coronavirus in these populations and other minority groups.17 
Furthermore, these communities make up the major part of the essential work force, such 
as grocery store, public transit, and home health workers, who have to work during 
 
the basics of United States tariff policy, its history, and Congressional and Presidential roles, see 
CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11030, U.S. TARIFF POLICY: OVERVIEW (2018).   
9 The 25% duty was imposed on July 6, 2018. See Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment 
Concerning Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,710 (June 20, 
2018). For key dates announcing tariffs, relevant notice and comment proceedings, and tariff deployment, 
see Bown & Kolb, supra note 7; BROCK R. WILLIAMS & KEIGH E. HAMMOND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
IN10943, ESCALATING U.S. TARIFFS: TIMELINE 4 (2020). 
10 See Chad P. Bown, Trump's Trade Policy is Hampering the US Fight Against COVID-19, PETERSON 
INST. INT’L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL’Y WATCH (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-trade-policy-hampering-us-fight-
against-covid-19. 
11 See Jeanna Smialek & Ana Swanson, American Consumers, Not China, Are Paying for Trump’s Tariffs, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/business/economy/trade-war-tariffs.html.  
12 See Bown, supra note 10. 
13 For a description of PPE shortages and supply chain problems, see Zoë Schlanger, Begging for 
Thermometers, Body Bags, and Gowns: U.S. Health Care Workers Are Dangerously Ill-Equipped to Fight 
COVID-19, TIME (Apr. 20, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://time.com/5823983/coronavirus-ppe-shortage/. 
14 See id.; Bown, supra note 10.  
15 See Richard Oppel Jr. Robert Gebeloff, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Will Wright & Mitch Smith, The Fullest Look 
Yet at the Racial Inequality of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html.   
16 See Kat Stafford, Meghan Hoyer & Aaron Morrison, Racial Toll of Virus Grows Even Starker as More 
Data Emerges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 18, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/8a3430dd37e7c44290c7621f5af96d6b. For a summary of racial disparities regarding 
virus cases, testing, mortality and data collection, see Zoë Carpenter, What We Know About the Covid-19 
Race Gap, THE NATION (May 4, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/covid-19-racial-
disparities/.   
17 This Article uses the terms Latino and African American since most of the cited studies refer to these 
terms. It uses different terms when directly quoting specific sources.   
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lockdowns.18 These essential workers have a critical need for PPE, typically face masks 
and gloves.19 For many essential jobs, the work force is overwhelmingly female and non-
white.20 Editorials in the medical journal Lancet described the need for PPE. 21 They 
emphasized this need for health care workers who are a “country’s most valuable resource” 
and explained that essential workers (largely African American or Latino) “face the 
greatest risk to their lives.”22 Even though COVID is called the great equalizer, the reality 
is that it spreads blindly into living, work, and health settings that are far from equal.  
This Article explains how trade policies, specifically tariffs on PPE imports, 
aggravate American experiences with COVID.23 The results are a disparate impact on 
minority communities because of a complex mix of virus and health inequality harms. This 
Article makes three arguments from legal, policy, and race-and-health perspectives. First, 
the Trump administration was able to continue the trade war because the executive branch 
has ample authority to implement additional tariffs. PPE and many more products are 
subject to tariffs enacted pursuant to Section 301 of the International Trade Act of 1974.24 
The executive branch has wide discretion to impose these levies when it determines that 
foreign practices are “unreasonable or discriminatory,” and “burden or restrict” American 
commerce.25 Accordingly, it applied Section 301 tariffs after determining that China 
appropriates intellectual property (IP) from American businesses and engages in cyber 
theft.26 This Article refers to this American trade measure as the “China Case.” The 
majority of the Article’s legal arguments focus on Section 301, its procedures, and the 
administration’s power to impose tariffs in Section 301 cases.   
Second, the Trump administration prioritized tariffs over ensuring that Americans 
could respond to the COVID pandemic. As a key part of the trade war, these tariffs try to 
 
18 See HYE JIN RHO, HALEY BROWN & SHAWN FREMSTAD, CTR. ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., A BASIC 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF WORKERS IN FRONTLINE INDUSTRIES (2020), https://cepr.net/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/2020-04-Frontline-Workers.pdf. 
19 See id. at 5-6.  
20 See JOCELYN FRYE, CTR. AM. PROGRESS, ON THE FRONTLINES AT WORK AND AT HOME (2020), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/04/22133103/WOCcorona-report-1.pdf/. 
21 COVID-19: protecting health-care workers, 395 LANCET 922 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(20)30644-9; The plight of essential workers during the COVID-19 pandemic, 395 LANCET 1587 
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31200-9.  
22 COVID-19: protecting health-care work, supra note 21; The plight of essential workers during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, supra note 21. 
23 This Article focuses on the COVID response from January to May of 2020. Public health policies 
continue to try to control the pandemic, with more recent outbreaks since June. Similarly, the United 
States-China trade war and the Section 301 case continues.      
24 See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 
2411). 
25 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1974). For a description of Section 301 and the case against China, see ANDRES B. 
SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RES. SERV., IF11346, SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2020). 
26 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER 
SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF (summarizing the findings by the United 
States Trade Representative’s Section 301 report of March 22, 2018, which serves as the basis for the 
tariffs described). For documents from the investigation, hearings and tariffs, see Section 301 – China, OFF. 
OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-
china (last visited July 27, 2020). 
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force changes in China’s IP and cyber theft practices.27 When PPE was subjected to 
additional duties the administration prioritized tariffs to compel changes in China over 
public health readiness.28 A viral epidemic like COVID was a predictable threat, worrying 
presidencies for decades.29 As a matter of policy in 2018 and 2019, the Trump 
administration chose not to remove many PPE items from Section 301 tariffs.30 Eventually, 
this exacerbated PPE shortages with price spikes and uncertainty in 2020, creating a PPE 
crisis. This policy persisted. In June 2020, months after the initial outbreak, United States 
Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer told Congress that the administration preferred 
tariffs for PPE even though PPE is needed to fight the pandemic.31 Section 301 protects 
these political choices made by the executive branch. 
Third, PPE shortages show that tariffs can exacerbate the existing health inequities 
that harm communities of color. The disastrous experiences of 2020 help chart how African 
Americans, Latinos, women, and other disenfranchised groups disproportionately suffer 
from the harms posed by new tariffs and virus outbreaks. Governmental research and 
scholarly data studies show racial inequities in COVID contraction, hospitalization, and 
death rates.32 These findings are continually updated as the pandemic progresses, but they 
confirm mounting evidence of racial disparities in the COVID response.33 Trump trade 
policies aggravated the pandemic for workers and non-workers who need PPE.34 Critical 
race health scholarship helps frame inquiries into how health policies appear race neutral 
but actually result in predictable negative consequences for Black, Indigenous, People of 
Color, and women.35 Racial disparity impacts the COVID response on three fronts: 
coronavirus exposure, virus susceptibility, and medical treatments.36 The PPE crisis 
 
27 See Bown & Kolb, supra note 7. 
28 See c.f. Deborah Abrams Kaplan, How Tariffs Ravaged the COVID-19 Medical Supply Chain, SUPPLY 
CHAIN DIVE (May 27, 2020), https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/coronavirus-tariffs-trade-medical-
supply-chain/578615/. 
29 For history of pandemic threats and American worries, see HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 1-2 (2005), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf. Since January 18, 2020 President Trump has been 
briefed on COVID. See Ursula Perano, 10 Times Trump and His Administration Were Warned About 
Coronavirus, AXIOS (Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.axios.com/trump-coronavirus-warnings-46ea8006-2e19-
4810-82c1-0f10f4f9aa97.html. 
30 See Bown, supra note 10. 
31 See Ana Swanson, Trump Trade Official Defends China Deal and Criticizes the W.T.O., N.Y. TIMES 
(June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/business/economy/us-trade-china-tariffs.html. 
32 See infra notes 246, 252-253 and accompanying text.  
33 This Article identifies the relationships between tariffs and PPE shortages, legal authority and tariffs, and 
racial consequences in the COVID response. It refers to quantitative studies on COVID’s racial disparities, 
demographic and occupational studies of essential and frontline workers, and scientific research on PPE’s 
effectiveness against the virus. This opens up the question of how PPE shortages add to health disparities. 
The essay does not make empirical claims about the effects of PPE prices, PPE supply, and PPE use by 
minority groups.     
34 See infra Part IV. 
35 See Osagie Obasogie, Irene Headen & Mahasin S. Mujahid, Race, Law, and Health Disparities: Toward 
a Critical Race Intervention, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 313 (2017); Chandra L. Ford & Collins O. 
Airhihenbuwa, Critical Race Theory, Race Equity, and Public Health: Toward Antiracism Praxis, 100 AM. 
J PUB. HEALTH s30 (2010); Camara Phyllis Jones, Invited Commentary: “Race,” Racism, and the Practice 
of Epidemiology, 154 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 299 (2001). 
36 See Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural Racism and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J. L. 
& BIOSCIENCES 1, 2 (2020). 
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exemplifies the economic burdens of trade policies, while simultaneously adding to racial 
disparities in health. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers a picture of the PPE crisis in the 
United States and how the federal government responded, focusing on January to May of 
2020. Part II describes Section 301 tariffs and the United States-China trade war. Part III 
explains how legal doctrine contributed to PPE shortages; and how constitutional and 
administrative law afford the executive branch, primarily the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), expansive authority to prioritize tariffs and deploy Section 
301. This Part also identifies ways to reform Section 301. Part IV explores the racial 
consequences of limited PPE; less protective equipment adds to racial disparities, defined 
as health inequalities closely associated with race.37   
I. COVID HITS. PPE SHORTAGES APPEAR AND LINGER. 
Since the pandemic began, questions about national PPE supplies have become 
increasingly commonplace. PPE is worn to block infections from blood, bodily fluids, or 
respiratory particles in the air and includes protective gowns, gloves, masks, goggles, and 
respirator masks.38 Most PPE is intended as single use, to be worn once and then discarded 
to minimize contamination. This equipment is common in health care settings, in surgery 
rooms, or for patient examinations. With a pandemic, the need for PPE extends far beyond 
hospitals. PPE is expected or required when people cannot keep a safe distance, for 
example in a grocery store or government office. PPE items vary in terms of level of 
protection and accordingly are subject to different Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
or National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) regulations.39  
Importantly, the American COVID response also depends on other imports like 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment,40 including ventilators, medical device parts, 
thermometers, and test swabs. These pharmaceutical and medical products have also been 
in short supply and are similarly subject to Section 301 levies. China is a significant source 
for these goods and PPE.41 For the sake of simplicity, this Article focuses on PPE, but 
comparable analysis could track how the trade war impacts these vital products. 
 
37 For descriptions of these terms, see Obasogie, Headen & Mujahid, supra note 35, at 31; Sara N. Bleich, 
Marian P. Jarlenski, Caryn N. Bell & Thomas A. LaVeist, Health Inequalities: Trends, Progress, and 
Policy, 33 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 7 (2012). 
38 See DABROWSKA & GREEN, supra note 4, at 1. PPE has been proven to stop the spread of COVID. See 
Derek K. Chu, Elie A. Akl, Stephanie Duda, Karla Solo, Sally Yaacoub & Holger J Schünemann, Physical 
Distancing, Face Masks, and Eye Protection to Prevent Person-to-Person Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 
and COVID-19: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 395 LANCET 1973 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31142-9. 
39 As an example, surgical masks and N95 masks provide different levels of protection and receive different 
regulatory approvals. See DABROWSKA & GREEN, supra note 4, at 1 (describing “device” under Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). There are three device classes, some require premarket submission. See 21 
C.F.R. § 807.87 (2019).  
40 See NINA M. HART, CONG. RES. SERV., LSB10424, COVID-19: AN OVERVIEW OF TRADE-RELATED 
MEASURES TO ADDRESS ACCESS TO MEDICAL GOODS (2020).  
41 See KAREN M. SUTTER, ANDRES B. SCHWARZENBERG & MICHAEL D. SUTHERLAND, CONG. RES. SERV., 
R46304, COVID-19: CHINA MEDICAL SUPPLY CHAINS AND BROADER TRADE ISSUES (2020).  
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Importantly, PPE and medical equipment scarcities result in increased virus exposure and 
aggravate medical treatments for COVID.42 
For months, Americans looked for PPE, while shortages persisted.43 Shortages were 
quickly evident. Describing the situation in March 2020, an Inspector General report from 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) noted that “widespread shortages of 
PPE put staff and patients at risk,” with the most needed items being masks (N95, surgical, 
and face shields), followed by gowns and gloves.44 This created a series of problems.45 
Health care workers had to reuse and conserve PPE, which is unsafe. Some relied on 
community donations or non-medical grade items, at times using homemade articles. In 
early April, a nationwide medical survey reported PPE demand spiking between 3 to 17 
times the usual rate, with demand at 8.6 times for face shields, 5 times for gowns, and 3.3 
times for surgical masks.46 In a Washington Post-Ipsos poll from May, nearly two-thirds 
of health care workers cited insufficient masks to filter airborne particles.47 The poll added 
that seven in ten of these workers worried about exposing their household to the virus, 58% 
said they had likely been exposed at work, and one-third said someone at work had been 
infected.48 Developed in response to this PPE crisis, the web-based platform GetUsPPE 
continues to report on PPE shortages.49  
Price hikes and delays in finding new stock characterized this PPE crisis. PPE is 
mostly sold through supply chains, which contributed to delays and shortages. Supply 
chains are cross-border systems of production and distribution, organized to take advantage 
 
42 See Schlanger, supra note 13. 
43 See id.; Bob Herman, Health Workers Fear New Shortages of Protective Equipment, AXIOS (July 13, 
2020), https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-personal-protective-equipment-masks-problems-ebb82bb1-
8429-489b-af64-61df2acb6818.html; Shawn Radcliffe, Why We May Run into PPE Shortages Again, 
HEALTHLINE (July 16, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/why-we-may-run-into-ppe-
shortages-again. For a description of how PPE shortage persisted after the first six months of 2020 and are 
predicted to last into 2021. 
44 CHRISTI A. GRIMM, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OEI-06-20-00300, 
HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PULSE 
SURVEY MARCH 23-27, 2020, at 3 (2020), https://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf. 
45 See id. at 9-10. 
46 See Premier Inc., Survey: As COVID-19 Spreads to New Hotspots, Hospitals Should Prepare for up to a 
17X Surge in Supply Demand, PREMIER (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.premierinc.com/newsroom/press-
releases/premier-inc-survey-as-covid-19-spreads-to-new-hotspots-hospitals-should-prepare-for-up-to-a-
17x-surge-in-supply-demand. 
47 See Washington Post-Ipsos Coronavirus Employment Survey, April 27-May 4, WASH. POST (May 20, 
2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/washington-post-ipsos-coronavirus-
employment-survey-april-27-may-4/4bd8dd8b-1257-4d5f-b3c1-0af6c38f060d/; Lenny Bernstein & Alauna 
Safarpour, Mask Shortage for Most Health-Care Workers Extended Into May, Post-Ipsos Poll Shows, 
WASH. POST (May 20, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/mask-shortage-for-most-
health-care-workers-extended-into-may-post-ipsos-poll-shows/2020/05/20/1ddbe588-9a21-11ea-ac72-
3841fcc9b35f_story.html. 
48 See Bernstein & Safarpour, supra note 47. 
49 See Our Data, GETUSPPE.ORG, https://getusppe.org/data/ (last visited July 27, 2020); Suhas Gondi, 
Adam L. Beckman, Nicholas Deveau, Ali S. Raja, Megan L. Ranney, Rachel Popkin & Shuhan He, 
Personal Protective Equipment Needs in the USA During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 395 LANCET e90 
(2020), 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31038-2; Nancy Crotti, Study: PPE Shortages Persist Nationwide, MASS 
DEVICE (May 15, 2020), https://www.massdevice.com/study-ppe-shortages-persist-nationwide/. 
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of overseas regulations and low labor costs.50 Supply chains result in low priced imported 
goods by structuring dedicated manufacturing, transport, and purchases. Supply chain 
problems in the United States caused price increases of 600% for surgical masks and 200% 
for medical gowns.51 Quotes from hospital buyers describe $0.50 masks sold for $6.00 and 
boxes of masks usually priced $2.28 offered for $70.00.52 As new vendors entered the void, 
American buyers started to deal directly with unknown sources, often overseas, and faced 
the threat of price gauging. Complicating matters, PPE shipments could be delayed by three 
to six months.53 Two things contributed to this: transports from China take three weeks to 
reach the United States, and China itself was recovering from the first COVID outbreak.54  
These shortages happen because supply chains prioritize low prices while sacrificing 
the flexibility to use alternative suppliers or to increase production.55 PPE is typically 
imported from overseas producers at low prices. This system depends on predictable 
supplies from China and anticipates American demand. But, when production or transport 
is disrupted or demand increases, as in a sudden pandemic, the system loses control over 
prices, supplies, and delivery times. This explains one aspect of the PPE crisis. 
Another dimension involves the trade war, which raised PPE prices and decreased 
supplies. On March 13, 2020 Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics explained how tariffs made PPE more expensive.56 Bown argued that Section 
301 levies “suddenly threatened to cripple” the COVID response and disrupted “access to 
medical products” when “they [were] needed the most.” 57 He identified applicable tariff 
rates for PPE and medical goods from China. Using specific products’ tariff schedule codes 
called “classifications,” the study detailed tariff increases and corresponding decreases in 
American purchases since the trade war began. For example, the USTR imposed tariff 
charges of 25% on medical headwear, hand sanitizer, thermometers, and others medical 
imports from China.58 Charges of 7.5% applied to goggles, protective clothing, net 
 
50 For a description of supply chains and PPE, see Kaplan supra note 28; SUTTER, SCHWARZENBERG & 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 41. For analysis the influence supply chains exert on global trade, see Grietje 
Baars, Jennifer Bair, Liam Campling, Dennis Davis, Klaas Hendrik Eller, Dez Farkas, Tomaso Ferrando, 
Jason Jackson, David Hansen-Miller, Elizabeth Havice, Claire Mummé, Jesse Salah Ovadia, David 
Quentin, Brishen Rogers, Jaakko Salminen & Benjamin Selwyn, The Role of Law in Global Value Chains: 
A Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 57 (2016); Dan Danielsen, Trade, Distribution and 
Development Under Supply Chain Capitalism, in WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED: A 
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR AN INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION 121 (Alvaro Santos, Chantal Thomas & David 
Trubek eds., 2019). 
51 See HART, supra note 40, at 2. 
52 See GRIMM, supra note 44, at 4; Jack Nicas, It’s Bedlam in the Mask Market, as Profiteers Out-Hustle 
Good Samaritans, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/technology/coronavirus-masks-shortage.html.  
53 See GRIMM, supra note 44, at 3. 
54 See SUTTER, SCHWARZENBERG & SUTHERLAND, supra note 41, at 2. 
55 See James Randall Patrinley Jr., Sean T. Berkowitz, Danny Zakria, Douglas J. Totten, Mumin Kurtulus 
& 
Brian C. Drolet, Lessons from Operations Management to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic, 44 J. MED. 
SYS. 129 (2020). 
56 See Bown, supra note 10. 
57 See id.  
58 For the sake of simplicity, these names paraphrase the actual identification for the goods. They are not 
the exact tariff schedule names, typically called classifications. The titles for classifications tend to be quite 
detailed and long. See id. Other goods also subject to additional tariffs include: CT, monitoring, ultrasound, 
x-ray, and oxygen concentrator equipment. See id. 
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headwear, gloves, and more.59 Bown summarized that the overall impact of these tariffs 
was a “sharp decline” in imports of critical products from China. Americans had to pay the 
higher prices because changing suppliers is difficult, and domestic manufacturers had to 
pay higher prices for parts and components needed for production.60  
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) confirmed that the 
United States was imposing these additional tariffs. In its April 2020 report to Congress, it 
found 112 different classifications of imported goods related to the COVID response.61 In 
June, an updated report found 203 product classifications, widening its scope to include 
pharmaceuticals, ingredients to make pharmaceuticals, hospital supplies, and items needed 
to administer a vaccine.62 Of these, 57% (116 classifications) were subject to Section 301 
tariffs, with 89 classifications subject to the 25% tariff rate and 27 classifications subject 
to the 7.5% rate.63 Accordingly, the USTR imposed the higher rate for 44% of COVID-
related products and the lower rate for 13% of those items. The USITC also found that 
thirty PPE classifications were COVID-related.64 More specifically, twenty-one PPE 
classifications were subject to Section 301 tariffs.65 These studies, from Bown and the 
USITC, show how PPE along with other medical supplies became casualties of the trade 
war. 
Put simply, as national supplies fell dramatically, Americans paid more for PPE 
needed to fight and avoid COVID. Bown called for an immediate and blanket end to 
Section 301 tariffs imposed on PPE and medical supplies. Other observers agreed.66 
 
59 See id.  
60 See id. 
61 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, COVID-19 RELATED GOODS: U.S. IMPORTS AND TARIFFS, PUB. NO. 
5047, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-576 (2020), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5047.xlsx (listing 
the total number in the Executive Summary).  
62 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, COVID-19 RELATED GOODS: U.S. IMPORTS AND TARIFFS (UPDATED), 
PUB. NO. 5073, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-576 (2020), 
https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/covid-
19_related_goods_us_imports_and_tariffs_commission.xlsx (listing the total number in the Executive 
Summary). These names paraphrase the actual identification for the goods. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at “Table 1: COVID-19 related goods duty rate and imports at the HTS 10-digit level.” This 
report defined PPE as “protective materials that are worn” and distinct from COVID tests, sterilization 
products, oxygen equipment, imaging and diagnostic equipment, non-PPE medical supplies, medicines, and 
other health care products. See id. at “Introduction.”       
65 See id.  
66 See Robert B. Zoellick, Opinion, Trump’s Tariffs Leave the U.S. Short on Vital Medical Supplies, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 19, 2020, at A19 (former Trade Representative criticizing economic isolationism and tariffs for 
PPE and medical supplies); Ryan Young, Report: Tariff Relief Would Help COVID-19 Recovery, 
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., July 8, 2020, https://cei.org/news_releases/report-tariff-relief-would-help-
covid-19-recovery/. See, e.g.,  Kaplan, supra note 28 (analyzing PPE tariff developments); Anabel 
González, A Memo to Trade Ministers on How Trade Policy Can Help Fight COVID-19, PETERSON INST. 
INT’L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL’Y WATCH (Mar. 23, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-
and-investment-policy-watch/memo-trade-ministers-how-trade-policy-can-help-fight-covid (proposing 
trade policy changes for the United States and other countries); Chloe Kent, How is the US China Trade 
War Hitting the Medical Device Industry, MED. DEVICE NETWORK (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://www.medicaldevice-network.com/features/us-china-trade-war-medical-devices/ (describing the call 
for tariff exemptions from before COVID).  
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Months later, trade war tariffs still apply to PPE imports with added costs passed on to 
buyers, workers, and the health care system.67 
The Trump administration had a series of responses to the PPE crisis, but avoided a 
blanket end to Section 301 charges for PPE. It continued its trade war posture. This policy 
called for a clear trade-off: tariffs are necessary to force important changes in China’s 
policies, even if American businesses pay for price hikes and our pandemic response 
suffers.  
The Trump administration’s responses to the PPE crisis were piecemeal and 
insufficient. Seven steps illustrate this. First, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and the FDA approved changes to allow face masks certified under 
NIOSH regulations for the COVID response.68 These are similar to N95 face coverings but 
were approved for use in settings other than health care, such as construction work. Second, 
the USTR began approving individual importer’s requests to avoid paying the Section 301 
charges. Called exclusions, they began on March 6, 2020.69 Described in more detail 
below, exclusions provide limited relief, since they are temporary. Third, on March 17, 
2020 the CDC changed its recommendations for face masks, suggesting that health care 
workers could wear less protective surgical masks, reuse masks, and even use homemade 
items, instead of the prior strict recommendation for N95 masks.70 It issued similar 
guidelines for eye protection and gowns.71 Fourth, on March 18, 2020 the President 
invoked the Defense Production Act (DPA) to spur American industry to produce PPE and 
medical equipment.72 The DPA compels private actors to prioritize sales of needed supplies 
to the government.73 Actually procuring supplies is not quick—manufacturers have months 
to prepare manufacturing capacities and then actually make the items. Eventually the 
 
67 See Kaplan, supra note 28. 
68 Encompassing a series of steps, these actions began with an Emergency Use Authorization on March 2, 
pursuant to NIOSH regulations (42 C.F.R. Part 84) and the Food Drugs and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 
360bbb-3). For a summary, see FDA News Release: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA and CDC 
Take Action to Increase Access to Respirators, Including N95s, for Health Care Personnel, FDA (Mar. 2, 
2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-and-cdc-
take-action-increase-access-respirators-including-n95s. For a description of the regulatory steps at the 
CDC, FDA, and NIOSH, see Letter from RADM Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., 
to Robert R. Redfield, MD, Dir. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/135763/download. 
69 The USTR approved exclusions on March 10, 16 and 17. See Kaplan, supra note 28. 
70 See Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Facemasks, CDC (June 28, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/face-masks.html. For how these regulatory 
changes were applied, see Zoë Carpenter, Health Care Workers Are Facing Burdens That Put Everyone at 
Risk, NATION (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/healthcare-workers-coronavirus-
ppe/. 
71 See Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Isolation Gowns, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/isolation-gowns.html (last updated Mar. 17, 
2020); Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Eye Protection, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/eye-protection.html (last updated July 15, 
2020). 
72 See Exec. Order No. 13,909, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,227 (Mar. 23, 2020). 
73 See Bryan Bender & Megan Cassella, Will Trump Be Able to Get Emergency Medical Supplies Fast 
Enough?, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2020, 7:36 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/18/coronavirus-
defense-production-act-trump-136316. 
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administration used its DPA powers to secure production contracts specifically for PPE.74 
Fifth, the USTR opened a comment process for importers to submit details on why COVID 
related goods should not be subject to Section 301 tariffs.75 Sixth, on March 29, 2020 
Project Airbridge provided expedited international transport for PPE and other needed 
imports.76 Seventh, the Strategic National Stockpile began distributing PPE and other 
supplies to states. By April 8, 2020 the stockpile was nearly depleted.77  
Critics describe these actions as too little, too late. Observers, including members of 
Congress, complained that it took the administration two months to start distributions from 
the stockpile and that the federal government did not coordinate PPE procurement.78 As 
COVID hospitalizations peaked in many places, this inaction left states to compete with 
each other for crucial supplies. These impressions reflect larger complaints that the 
administration did not act fast enough to respond to COVID. Starting in January, it did not 
recognize the real threat to Americans, support testing, include emergency management in 
its response, or invoke the DPA until these actions were too late.79   
As the pandemic persisted, Congress acted to secure PPE and investigate these 
shortages. On March 27, 2020, it passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic 
 
74 See Tony Bertuca, DOD Details Latest Defense Production Act Move to Increase N95 Mask Supply, 
INSIDE DEF. (Apr. 21, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://insidedefense.com/insider/dod-details-latest-defense-
production-act-move-increase-n95-mask-supply (describing PPE production contracts with 3M, O&M 
Halyward, and Honeywell with expected production by June, within six months, and within ten months 
respectively); Release, DOD Announces Defense Production Act Title 3 COVID-19 PPE Project, U.S. 
DEP’T DEF. (May 28, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2200654/dod-
announces-defense-production-act-title-3-covid-19-ppe-project-22-million-in/ (describing a contract with 
Hollingsworth & Vose expecting production by August); and Chris Newmarker, U.S. Defense Department 
Using Defense Production Act to Boost N95 masks Supply, MASS DEVICE (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.massdevice.com/u-s-defense-department-using-defense-production-act-to-boost-n95-masks-
supply/ (reporting a contract for mask decontamination services for various locations nationwide). 
75 See USTR: Response to Coronavirus Crisis, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/march/ustr-response-coronavirus-
crisis. 
76 For how Project Airbridge started and its challenges, see Memorandum from Carolyn B. Maloney, Chair
woman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, to James E. Clybourn, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Cor
onavirus 4 (July 2, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/
Project%20Airbridge%20Memo%2007-02-20.pdf. 
77 See Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, Chairwoman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, New 
Document Shows Inadequate Distribution of Personal Protective Equipment and Critical Medical Supplies 
to States (Apr. 8, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/new-document-shows-inadequate-
distribution-of-personal-protective-equipment-and. 
78 See Memorandum from Carolyn Maloney, supra note 76; Michael Biesecker, HHS: Federal Stocks of 
Protective Equipment Nearly Depleted, AP (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/a464316e25560d393bd07a021b7e81ba (placing criticism of the stockpile in the context 
of response to COVID). For a description of claims of political preferences between states, limited 
transparency, and federal confiscation of supplies for states, see Adam Clark Estes, America’s Emergency 
Medical Stockpile Is Almost Empty. Nobody Knows What Happens Next, VOX (Apr. 7, 2020, 11:20 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/3/21206170/us-emergency-stockpile-jared-kushner-almost-empty-
coronavirus-medical-supplies-ventilators. 
79 See Michael Biesecker, US ‘Wasted’ Months Before Preparing for Coronavirus Pandemic, AP (Apr. 5, 
2020), https://apnews.com/090600c299a8cf07f5b44d92534856bc; Marisa Fernandez, Timeline: How the 
U.S. Fell Behind on the Coronavirus, AXIOS (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-timeline-
trump-administration-testing-c0858c03-5679-410b-baa4-dba048956bbf.html. 
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Security Act (CARES Act), which includes PPE provisions.80 Congress also used its 
oversight powers to attain information about PPE shortages, the administration’s response, 
and tariffs.81 For example, on March 21, 2020 chairs of six House committees requested a 
briefing with HHS Secretary Alex Azar. After summarizing “widespread shortages,” they 
asked about plans to “acquire and distribute” PPE, how the HHS would use the DPA, and 
how it would work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).82 On April 
6, 2020, the chairs of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee 
on Finance asked the USITC for details on tariff rates for goods related to the COVID 
response.83 They described “an urgent public health crisis on the scale that we have not 
encountered in over a century” that was “severely exacerbated by disruptions and 
deficiencies in supply” of needed equipment.84 Next, Senators Thomas R. Carper (D-DE) 
and Pat Toomey (R-PA) requested that the USTR “immediately and broadly suspend 301 
tariffs” on products needed to manufacture critical medical supplies.85 They explained that 
there was “an extreme shortage” of “supplies needed to respond” to the pandemic, 
including PPE.86 On another front, members of Congress proposed legislation to address 
COVID’s racial disparities and improve PPE supplies in the United States.87  
 
80 See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No: 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (codified in 
scattered sections of U.S.C.) (Section 3102 requires that the strategic national stockpile include PPE; 
Section 3101 requires the HHS and National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on 
the security of the United States medical product supply chain; Section 3103 revises the liability protections 
for use of NIOSH approved masks; Section 12003 requires the HHS to consider distributing PPE to prison 
for inmates and staff; Section 20005 and 2009 focus on similar requirements for Veterans Administration 
facilities.). 
81 For example, House and Senate committees requested that the USITC investigate PPE supplies, see 
USITC, USITC To Investigate Industry and Supply Chain Conditions Affecting COVID-19 Industry Sectors 
and Products, New Release 20-097, Inv. No. 332, -580, (Aug. 21, 2020), 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2020/er0821ll1634.htm. 
82 Letter from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Ranking Member Jim 
Jordan, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, and Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform to Alex 
M. Azar II, U. S. Sec. of Health and Hum. Servs, and Robert Kadlee, Assistant Sec. for Preparedness and 
Response, Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. (Mar. 21, 2020), 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020-03-
21.CBM%20SFL%20JR%20Rouda%20GEC%20to%20HHS%20re%20PPE%20%281%29.pdf.  
83 See Letter from Richard E. Neal, Chairman, Comm. on Ways and Means, & Charles E. Grassley, 
Chairman, Comm. on Fin., to David Johanson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm. (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/imports_covid_19_request_letter.pdf. 
84 See id. 
85 See Letter from Thomas R. Carper, U.S. Senator, & Pat Toomey, U.S. Senator, to Robert E. Lighthizer, 
U.S. Trade Rep. (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.carper.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d/e/de9a8045-c5f9-
4903-861a-53b0176de96d/A69A0D7987C83D56CAFBDE3C25DC6711.2020.04.17---letter-to-ustr-re-
emergency-tariff-suspensions-for-medical-supply-chain---final.pdf. 
86 See id. 
87 The COVID-19 Racial and Ethnic Disparities Task Force Act would require data-driven 
recommendations to allocate crucial resources, including PPE, in communities with racial disparities. See 
Press Release, Durbin: If We Don't Address Racial Health Care Disparities, Shame On Us, DICK DURBIN 
U.S. SENATOR ILL. (May 5, 2020), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-if-we-
dont-address-racial-health-care-disparities-shame-on-us. The Equitable Data Collection and Disclosure on 
COVID-19 Act would require the CDC to post online data regarding “testing, treatment, and fatalities, 
disaggregated by race, ethnicity, sex, age, socioeconomic status, disability status, county, and other 
demographic information.” Id.; see also NCPA Staff, Senators Toomey and Hassan coordinate to make 
PPE more accessible, NORTHCENTRALPA.COM (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.northcentralpa.com/life/covid-
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Congress also heard from federal agents who reported on these shortages or tried to 
spur faster responses to COVID. On May 26, 2020, Christi A. Grimm testified before the 
House Oversight Committee.88 She served as the principle investigator for the mentioned 
HHS report.89 The Trump administration replaced Grimm at the HHS, allegedly because 
the report’s conclusions drew negative attention to the administration’s inaction.90 This 
came after former director of the United States Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority, Rick Bright, explained that the administration failed to take 
“critical steps” in January and February 2020.91 He described that he was removed because 
he disagreed with administration positions.  
In sum, PPE was in short supply as a coronavirus pandemic initially hit the United 
States during the first half of 2020. Imposed since 2018, tariffs not only increased prices 
for these desperately needed products, but they resulted in decreased PPE imports. Despite 
knowing about COVID’s pandemic risks since January, the federal government did too 
little far too late to respond to the PPE crisis. It did not eliminate PPE or medical equipment 
from Section 301 tariffs. Instead, the administration preferred to stay the course with the 
posture that levies are needed during a trade war.   
II. THE UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADE WAR RESULTS IN SECTION 301 TARIFFS. 
The United States imposed additional tariffs on PPE pursuant to Section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act), intended to combat unfair trade practices by foreign 
states.92 Section 301 is one of many measures that are part of a trade war with China. One 
objective of this trade war is to change Chinese industrial policies, implicating foreign and 
economic relations between the two countries. Specific to trade, this conflict involves 
thousands of goods subject to Section 301 levies; separate American tariffs on steel 
(Section 232) and solar panels and washing machines (Section 201); and tariff retaliations 
from China.93 Before the Trump administration initiated the China case in 2017, the last 
Section 301 investigation was in 2013.94 To contextualize PPE shortages, this part of the 
Article describes basic elements of Section 301 and the China Case. This analysis of 
 
19_updates/senators-toomey-and-hassan-coordinate-to-make-ppe-more-accessible/article_c9843b5c-d9d1-
11ea-9e1b-03003d3e876a.html (describing S.4497 Stop PPE Taxes Act of 2020 and S.4501 Strategic 
Global Supply Chains Act of 2020).  
88 See Dan Diamond, HHS Watchdog Vows Independence Amid Trump Actions, POLITICO (May 26, 2020, 
2:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/26/hhs-watchdog-vows-independence-amid-trump-
actions-282249. 
89 See CHRISTI A. GRIMM, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OEI-06-20-
00400, HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL 
PULSE SURVEY MARCH 23-27, 2020, at 3 (2020), https://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf. 
90 See Peter Baker, Trump Moves to Replace Watchdog Who Identified Critical Medical Shortages, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/us/politics/trump-health-department-
watchdog.html?referringSource=articleShare. 
91 See Marisa Fernandez, Ousted Vaccine Chief: I was Told My Pandemic Warnings Were “Causing a 
Commotion,” AXIOS (May 14, 2020), https://www.axios.com/rick-bright-testimony-coronavirus-response-
d1362f5e-9033-481b-afb7-5e1a716f52bc.html. 
92 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)-(c). 
93 For a description of these tariff actions, see BROCK R. WILLIAMS & KEIGH E. HAMMOND, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R45949, U.S.-CHINA TARIFF ACTIONS BY THE NUMBERS (2019).  
94 See SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11346, supra note 25. There have been 127 Section 301 
cases since 1974. See id. 
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Section 301 illustrates how executive action can prioritize tariffs. The PPE crisis is one 
socioeconomic impact resulting from these executive choices.95 As described below, the 
PPE crisis adds to racial disparity in the COVID response. 
“Section 301” refers to a set of American trade measures in sections 301 to 310 of 
the Trade Act.96 Relevant to the PPE crisis, the Section 301 China Case developed in three 
stages. In chronological order, the USTR: (1) investigated foreign conduct that hurt 
American commerce, (2) imposed retaliatory sanctions to remedy this, and (3) decided 
which particular goods, if any, were excluded from these sanctions. PPE imports became 
part of the second and third stages.  
For the first stage, the USTR investigates possible trade harms. It examines if the 
foreign nation violates a trade agreement, pursues “unjustifiable” action that “burdens or 
restricts” American commerce, or engages in “unreasonable or discriminatory” action that 
“burdens or restricts” American commerce.97 The USTR conducts the investigation and 
recommends sanctions or not, in consultation with an intra-agency committee and the 
private sector. 98 It consults with the foreign country before starting the investigation.99 
Referred to as the “determination,” the USTR makes recommendations based on the 
investigation.100As described below, this investigation started the China Case, which is 
currently in the retaliation stage.  
Initiated on August 24, 2017, the investigation into China regards “Technology 
Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation.”101 The USTR issued its investigation 
report on March 22, 2018 with four general findings.102 First it found that China forces 
technology transfers with government mechanisms including administrative procedures, 
joint venture requirements, and others. Additionally, its licensing policies deprive 
American companies from setting market-based terms in technology transactions. Next, 
China directs investments in American companies to control strategic assets, such as for 
the Made in China 2020 initiative. Lastly, China supports the cyber theft of trade secrets 
and IP. Highlighting economic harms in technology and IP, these findings are the reason 
for American retaliation in the China Case.    
In a second stage called retaliation, Section 301 provides for trade sanctions, 
including various measures that the USTR can choose from, one of which is tariffs.103 The 
 
95 Domestic law typically addresses the economic dislocations and social consequences of trade policies. 
Trade policies usually focus on the international arena, such as reaching or complying with trade 
agreements or treatment for inbound foreign imports, but domestic law responds to its effects, see c.f. 
Timothy Meyer, Trade, Redistribution and the Imperial Presidency, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 16 (2018); 
Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 2 (2019). 
96 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411. 
97 “Unreasonable” is defined as “unfair and “inequitable” and “not necessarily in violation of, or 
inconsistent with” international obligations. 19 U.S.C. §2411(d)(3)(A). “Unjustifiable” is defined as in 
violation of, or inconsistent with these obligations. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(4)(A). Discriminatory actions 
include the denial of national or most-favored- nation treatment. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5). 
98 See 19 U.S.C. § 2155. 
99 See 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1). 
100 See 19 U.S.C. § 2414. 
101 It was initiated on August 18, 2017. See Initiation of Section 301 Investigation, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,213 
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/FRN%20China301.pdf. 
102 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS,  supra note 26.  
103 Other measures include suspending trade concessions and imposing import restrictions. See 19 U.S.C. § 
2411(b)-(c). 
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United States applies these sanctions in order to compel a change in foreign practices with 
the objective that added economic costs of exporting to the United States will motivate a 
change. During this stage, the USTR designates a list of goods that will be subject to 
additional tariffs. The USTR issues a list proposal along with a Notice-and-Comment 
announcement in the Federal Register.104 It requests comments on the potential economic 
harm caused by additional tariffs.105 Based on public hearings and statements received in 
the hearing or in response to the Notice-and-Comment, the USTR, in consultation with 
other agencies, determines what goods warrant additional tariffs and their applicable tariff 
rate.  
These executive choices result in predictable negative socioeconomic impacts 
because additional tariffs increase the price paid for products in the United States. The PPE 
industry predicted the potential negative consequences. For instance, during this stage in 
the China Case, distributors of PPE and medical products asked the USTR to remove their 
products from the tariff list.106 In a public hearing, they explained that PPE is a “critical 
component of our nation's response to public health emergencies, such as Ebola.”107 When 
the USTR decided to keep these products on the tariff list, it effectively prioritized tariffs.  
As the China Case entered the retaliation stage, the United States and China both 
publicly threatened and proceeded with multiple escalating tariff rounds. On March 22, 
2018, President Trump authorized additional tariffs for imports from China.108 Consistent 
with the President’s prior comments, the USTR predicted that imports from China would 
have a 25% tariff rate.109 The USTR deployed retaliatory tariffs in four rounds. The first 
two rounds applied the 25% rate on July 6 and August 23 of 2018, for an estimated $34 
billion and $16 billion in imports respectively.110 On June 15, 2019, a third round imposed 
this rate to an additional $200 billion in imports.111 Later that year, a fourth round was 
divided into two lists, 4A and 4B. The USTR deployed List 4A on September 1, 2019, with 
a 15% tariff rate for $126 billion in imports.112 Then, announced on January 15, 2020 in a 
“Phase One Agreement,” the United States and China agreed to stop new rounds of 
 
104 See, e.g., Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of 
Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 Fed. Reg. 14,906 (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/FRN301.pdf. 
105 This includes whether increased duties on a specific product help eliminate unfair economic practices 
and cause “disproportionate economic harm” to American interests. See Notice of Action, 83 Fed. Reg. 
14,906, 14,908. 
106 See Section 301 Tariffs Public Hearing: Hearing Before the U.S. Trade Rep. 301 Comm., at 386 (Aug. 
20, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/0820USTR.pdf (statement from 
Matt Rowan, President, Health Indus. Distribs. Ass’n) [hereinafter Rowan Testimony]. 
107 See id.  
108 See Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Laws, Policies, 
Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg, 
13,099 (Mar. 22, 2018). 
109 These determinations are pursuant to sections 301(b), 301(c), and 304(a), codified at 19 U.S.C. § 
2411(b), 2411(c), 2414(a). See Notice of Action, 83 Fed. Reg. 14,906. 
110 See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10708, ENFORCING U.S. TRADE LAWS: SECTION 301 
AND CHINA 1 (2019).  
111 The prior September, a 10% tariff rate had been imposed on these goods. See id. 
112 See WILLIAMS & HAMMOND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN10943, supra note 9, at 4. 
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tariffs.113 This agreement, implemented on February 14, 2020, suspended List 4B.114 It kept 
the List 4A tariff rate at 7.5% and kept the rates for the three prior rounds. 115 By then, 
China was deep into fighting the COVID epidemic, while virus spread in the United States 
was just becoming apparent. As of November 2020, this is where retaliation in the China 
Case remains. 
In the third stage of a Section 301 case, goods may be excluded from the additional 
tariff charges. Specifically, private parties request that the USTR remove a particular goods 
classification from the tariff list, with the USTR then approving or denying these. For this, 
private parties submit comments and provide testimony in response to the USTR’s Notice-
and-Comment requesting information on the product’s supply.116 Initially, in June 2018, 
long before COVID, the USTR developed an exclusion process.117 This was the first time 
that the USTR established a process to request exclusions for 301 tariffs.118  
In 2019, noting that their products would likely be subject to a 25% duty, producers 
of PPE and medical supplies again requested that the USTR remove their goods from the 
tariff list.119 This time the producers asked to be excluded from the tariff lists.120 They 
requested this after the USTR announced the tariff lists and included products from these 
producers.121 The producers predicted what eventually occurred in 2020, i.e. the PPE 
crisis.122 Medical supplies and PPE makers explained that Section 301 tariffs would 
immediately increase costs for “hospitals, surgery centers, long-term care facilities, 
individual consumers, and government programs” with no real alternative source for the 
products than China.123 Specific to a pandemic, they detailed compromised supply chains, 
 
113 See Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of The People’s Republic of China Text, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china/phase-one-trade-
agreement/text. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 The USTR requests information regarding the product and its availability from non-Chinese sources, 
attempts to procure it from the United States and other countries, reviews whether the imposition of Section 
301 tariffs causes severe economic harm to American interests, and determines the product’s importance to 
the Made in China 2025 program, see for example, Procedures To Consider Requests for Exclusion, 83 
Fed. Reg. 32,181 (July 11, 2018). In the past, such exclusions were based on the USTR finding that in 
extraordinary cases the 301 action would cause an “adverse impact” on United States economy 
“substantially out of proportion to benefits” of the action, see 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B) (iv), or “would 
cause serious harm to the national security,” see 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)(2)(B)(iv-v). 
117 See, e.g., Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of 
Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,710 (June 20, 2018). 
118 See ANDRES B. SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11582, SECTION 301: TARIFF EXCLUSIONS ON 
U.S. IMPORTS FROM CHINA (2020). 
119 See Section 301 Tariffs Public Hearing: Hearing Before the U.S. Trade Rep. 301 Comm., at 191-92 
(June 20, 
2019) (testimony of Lara Simmons, Medline Indus., Inc.), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/30
1Investigations/Section_301_Hearing_Transcript_on_Proposed_Tariffs_Day_4.pdf [hereinafter Simmons 
Testimony]; see id. at 197-98 (testimony of Linda O’Neill, Health Indus. Distribs. Ass’n) [hereinafter 
O’Neill Testimony]. 
120 Simmons Testimony, supra note 119; O’Neill Testimony, supra note 119. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 196, 201. 
123 See id. at 191-92. 
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which would put public health preparedness at risk.124 They pointed to recent viral 
epidemics, such as Ebola and H1NI, as proof of when demand for PPE increases 
fivefold.125 In these circumstances, PPE was “critical” to any response.126 This was the 
second attempt by PPE producers and distributors to avoid additional tariffs. 
Some PPE products did have their exclusion requests approved. For instance, face 
masks received a partial exclusion from the 7.5% tariff rate, announced on March 17, 2020. 
127 The USTR did not announce many PPE exclusions, such as for goggles, medical gloves, 
textile gloves, or disposable hospital apparel, until after the COVID outbreak in the United 
States.128 These approved exclusions applied retroactively based on when the Section 301 
tariff rate was imposed and expired on August 7 or September 1, 2020.129  
However, beginning in 2018, the USTR did not approve many PPE exclusions.130 
The following protective items were subject to the 25% tariff rate without any exclusion: 
headgear, plastic aprons, protective aprons, garments made of rubber, and textiles 
reinforced with rubber.131 These products were similarly subject to the 7.5% tariff rate: 
surgical gowns, gloves, hair nets, patient gowns, hospital gowns, and scrubs.132 For these 
products, PPE importers would have to pay these added taxes when their goods entered the 
United States.133 Customs officials would start imposing these charges depending on when 
they were announced, as part of Section 301 tariff round 1, 2, 3 or 4A.134 By not approving 
these exclusions for PPE, the USTR reaffirmed its prioritization of tariffs over public health 
readiness.  
After COVID became an American emergency, the USTR reacted but did not shift 
its position that PPE goods would be part of a Section 301 retaliation.135 It began 
considering items needed for the pandemic response.136 This came as the USTR announced 
a supplemental comment request on March 20, 2020.137 The USTR invited comments 
 
124 See id. at 196, 201. 
125 See O’Neill Testimony, supra note 119. 
126 See id.  
127 This included N95 respirators, surgical masks, disposable masks, shoe covers, and textile face masks 
with plastic face shields. This exclusion was retroactively applied to include additional duties paid since 
September 1, 2019. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 62, at “Table 3: Products listed in table 1 
that are excluded from Section 301 duties” Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 10-digit code: 
6307.90.9889.  
128 See id., at HTS 10-digit code: 9004.90.0000, 3926.20.9050, 4015.19.0510, 4015.19.0550, 6116.10.6500, 
6210.10.5000 
129 See id. 
130 See Josh Zumbrun & Anthony DeBarros, U.S. Grants Tariff Exemptions for More Medical-Goods from 
China, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-grants-tariff-exemptions-
for-more-medical-goods-from-china-11584125840. 
131 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 62, at HTS 10-digit codes: 3926.20.9010, 4015.19.1010, 
4015.90.0050, 6505.00.9089.  
132 See id. at HTS 10-digit codes: 6113.00.1012, 6210.50.5555, 6211.43.1091, 6211.42.1081, 6216.00.5420, 
6505.00.0100, 6505.00.9089. 
133 See Bown, supra note 10. 
134 See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10708, ENFORCING U.S. TRADE LAWS: SECTION 301 
AND CHINA 1 (2019). 
135 See Ana Swanson, Trump Trade Official Defends China Deal and Criticizes the W.T.O., N.Y. TIMES 
(June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/business/economy/us-trade-china-tariffs.html 
(reporting an administration preference for PPE tariffs five months after the virus entered the country). 
136 See USTR: Response to Coronavirus Crisis, supra note 75. 
137 See id. 
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regarding “tariff actions and relevant responses to the coronavirus.”138 Earlier that month, 
it started approving exclusions for PPE and medical products,139 without announcing them 
as COVID related.140  
The USTR’s March 20 request focused on “medical-care products needed to address 
the COVID-19 outbreak” and possible “modifications to remove duties from additional 
medical-care products.”141 It asked for a particular explanation of “how [each particular] 
product relates to the response.”142 This explanation could include whether the item is 
directly used to treat the virus, limit the outbreak, or produce needed “medical-care 
products.”143 For three months after this USTR announcement, it was unclear how the 
USTR would use these pandemic related comments.144 By July 2020, the USTR received 
over 600 comments regarding COVID-related products.145 On its webpage, it stated that it 
was “not planning to hold hearings” for these products and how Section 301 tariffs impact 
them.146 It did request public comments on whether exclusions from these duties should be 
extended beyond their September 1, 2020 deadline.147 This means that the USTR 
considered extending general exclusions from additional tariffs. USTR consideration is not 
specific to COVID-related products. It is unlikely that that PPE products will receive a 
blanket exclusion from Section 301 tariffs. Accordingly, PPE products may only receive 
tariff relief after the USTR reviews and then approves an exclusion request for a particular 
product classification. 
 
138 See id. 
139 This included PPE such as examination gloves, single-use surgical drapes, single-used and medical 
masks, and “certain other protective articles” and various medical equipment, medical parts, and sanitation 
items. See Lars-Erik Hjelm, Suzanne Kane, Emily Fuller Opp & Andrew Schlossberg, USTR Requests 
Comments on Section 301 Tariffs on COVID-19 Related Products, JD SUPRA (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ustr-requests-comments-on-section-301-44066/. It also included 
patient bags, medical waste disposal bags. See Zumbrun & DeBarros, supra note 130. 
140 For an initial description of this, see Bown, supra note 10. For these exclusions in March, see Notice of 
Product Exclusions, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,970 (March 10, 2020) and 85 Fed. Reg. 15,244 (Mar. 17, 2020) 
(applying exclusions for tariffs since Sept. 1, 2019 with exclusions expiring Sept. 1, 2020); Notice of 
Product Exclusions, 85 Fed. Reg, 15,015 (Mar. 16, 2020) (applying exclusions for tariffs since September 
24, 2018, and with exclusions expiring August 7, 2020).  
141 See Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to Address COVID-19: 
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation, 
85 Fed. Reg. 16,987 (2020). 
142 See id. 
143 See id. The USTR began this separate request, since the public comment period window for exclusions 
had closed before COVID. See Mark K. Neville, Jr., Trade in the Time of COVID-19: Make America 
Healthy Again!, 31 J. INT’L TAX’N 30 (2020). 
144 See SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RES. SERV., IF11582, supra note 118, at 2. 
145 See Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to Address COVID-19, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USTR-2020-0014 (last visited July 31, 2020).  
146 See FAQS FOR REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE 301 ACTION TO 
ADDRESS COVID-19: CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/FAQs_on_Additional_Modifications_to_
Address_COVID-19.pdf (last updated June 26, 2020). 
147 See Request for Comments Concerning the Extension of Particular Exclusions of Particular Exclusions 
Granted Under the $300 Billion Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices 
Related to Technology, Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,482 (2020).  
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Exclusions provide minimal relief from the tax burdens felt by Americans from 
Section 301 retaliation. In most cases these imports cost more to enter the United States, 
and this cost is passed to domestic consumers.148 An exclusion requires a stakeholder to 
affirmatively make a request. But most importantly, even after the slow process, the USTR 
rarely approves such requests. For instance, through January 31, 2020, the USTR received 
52,746 exclusion requests and only approved 13% of them, while denying 87% of them.149 
In July, the USTR extended the exclusions for some—not all—goods that had been 
previously approved.150 These determinations do not mention any COVID-related 
products. In September, the USTR extended more exclusions until December 31, 2020, but 
not for all of the ones initially approved.151 As 2020 ended, the USTR approved exclusions 
for some medical-care products to address COVID–19, effective January 1, 2021 to March 
31, 2021.152 These exclusions are primarily for medical equipment and products but include 
some PPE. 153  
In sum, tariffs on PPE are part of a larger Section 301 case, investigating and then 
retaliating against technology transfers and IP policies and practices in China.154 
Consequently, the administration has imposed tariff increases, up to 25%, for over a 
thousand imported goods, including PPE.155 With Section 301, President Trump was able 
to follow through with a campaign promise and apply tariffs to force changes in China.156 
More importantly, Section 301 allows the executive branch to control when to deploy 
additional tariffs, how long they are imposed, and at what tariff rate.  
 
148 See Smialek & Swanson, supra note 11. 
149 These figures refer to approvals and denials as of October 25, 2020, see CONG. RSCH. SERV., SECTION 
301: TARIFF EXCLUSIONS ON U.S. IMPORTS FROM CHINA, IF11582 (2020). 
150 See, e.g., Notice of Product Exclusion Extensions: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to 
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,267 (July 9, 2020) 
(announcing extensions until Dec. 31, 2020); Notice of Product Exclusion, 84 Fed. Reg. 43,291 (July 12, 
2020) (announcing exclusions applied retroactively); Request for Comments Concerning the Extension of 
Particular Exclusions Expiring in October 2020 Granted Under the $34 Billion Action Pursuant to Section 
301, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,777 (Aug. 3, 2020) (requesting comments regarding possible extensions for 
exclusions expiring on Oct. 2, 2020). 
151 See, e.g., Notice of Product Exclusions Extensions, 85 Fed. Reg. 54616 (Sept. 2, 2020). See also David 
Lawder, U.S. Extends some China Tariff exclusions only through year end, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2020), 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-tariffs/u-s-extends-some-china-tariff-exclusions-only-
through-year-end-idUKKBN25S5CT. 
152 See Notice of Product Exclusion Extensions and Additional Modifications: China’s Acts, Policies, and 
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 85 Fed. Reg. 85,831 (Dec. 
29, 2020). 
153 This includes aprons, gloves in Annex C and face shields, face masks, gloves, and shoe covers in Annex 
D. See id.   
154 See supra Part II.  
155 See Bown, supra note 10; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra notes 61-62.  
156 For examples of Trump discussing China during the 2016 president campaign, see Veronica 
Stracqualursi, 10 Times Trump attacked China and its trade relations with the US, ABC NEWS (Nov. 9, 
2017, 6:55AM),  
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/10-times-trump-attacked-china-trade-relations-us/story?id=46572567; 
Nick Corasaniti, Alexander Burns & Binyamin Appelbaum, Donald Trump Vows to Rip Up Trade Deals 
and Confront China, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/us/politics/donald-
trump-trade-speech.html. 
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III. SECTION 301 INSULATES CHOICES TO FAVOR TARIFFS OVER EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS. 
The Trump administration employed additional taxes on imports from China with 
statutory powers delegated by Congress in Section 301. Even though the Constitution 
expressly provides that tariff powers belong to Congress,157 the executive branch may 
impose these types of tariffs in response to various situations, with minimal or no checks 
by Congress or the courts.158 An administration can apply these duties when it determines 
that imports threaten national security (Section 232),159 when import quantities harm 
domestic industry (Section 201),160 or when foreign states engage in unfair trade practices 
(Section 301).161 This Article refers to these as “executive tariffs,” since the executive 
branch determines when they are imposed, how this happens, and for how long. Executive 
tariffs have an established place in American trade policies and the Trump administration 
increased their use.162 This runs contrary to free trade liberalizations and Congressional 
control of tariff policies generally.163 But importantly, executive tariffs create significant 
economic burdens in the United States felt by consumers and importers. For instance, as 
imports faced added custom levies PPE prices increased and supplies decreased. As 
explained in Part IV, this has racial consequences for virus exposure and COVID 
treatments. Black, Indigenous, and People of Color disproportionately catch COVID, die 
from it, and makeup the majority of essential workers. Applied pursuant to Section 301, 
tariffs decreased PPE supplies and increased their prices most needed by these patients and 
workers.     
This Part describes executive tariffs as one legal aspect of the trade war. It focuses 
on how the power to impose executive tariffs: (a) effectively insulates executive actions 
from governmental checks, (b) aggravates the COVID response by reducing available PPE, 
and (c) can be reformed by requiring more of a role for Congress. With this delegated 
power, the Trump administration prioritized tariffs on Chinese goods over preparedness 
for American public health and healthcare systems.  
A.   Traditionally Presidents Freely Deploy Section 301. 
The expanded use of executive tariffs raises important separation of powers 
questions regarding how Congress and the executive branch devise and implement trade 
 
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 (stating Congress has the power “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts, and Excises” and “To regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations”). 
158 For a description of how these delegations started historically, see Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics 
in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L. REV. 285, 287 (1986). 
159 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862. 
160 See Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251. 
161 See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411. 
162 Congress and the President do work together to craft trade policy. “Fast track” authority exemplifies this 
when Congress approves executive-led trade negotiations for international agreements, such as recently 
with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. For a description of this, see Trade Act of 1974 § 151, 
19 U.S.C. § 2191. 
163 See, e.g., Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (2020) 
(illustrating how these tariffs function as security-based exceptions to international trade commitments and 
proposing new delegation standards to offset these harms); Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade 
and Separation of Powers, 107 CAL. L. REV. 583 (2019) (arguing for a rebalance of the constitutional 
power over trade with Congress more active in multiple trade policy areas). 
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policy. Kathleen Claussen explains that executive tariffs operate as security exceptions 
delegated by Congress, allowing the Executive a way to employ tariffs to respond to 
perceived threats.164 They can undo international trade commitments approved by 
Congress, potentially veering far from their original statutory purpose.165 Timothy Meyer 
and Ganesh Sitaraman point to Congress’s complex cession of trade powers to the 
executive branch.166 This cession includes Section 301, as well as authority to fast track 
trade negotiations, initiate and pursue trade wars, withdraw from international trade 
treaties, and make international trade commitments.167 As these legal scholars explain, 
tensions between the two branches over trade policy develop in many areas, not solely with 
Section 301.  
Seen as a constitutional allocation of government powers, Section 301 tariffs 
function as a presidential action without input from Congress.168 The USTR must report or 
consult with Congress in various instances, but not much more.169 The Trade Act delegates 
management of Section 301 to the USTR, within the Executive Office of the President.170 
It states that the President may take action when the USTR makes its determination 
regarding unfair foreign practices.171 Investigations are under USTR control. Directing the 
USTR and responsible for the Section 301 process, the Trade Representative is a political 
appointee, typically working closely with, if not directly following instructions from, the 
White House.172 Civil servants conduct USTR tasks during the investigation, retaliation, 
and exclusion stages.173 In this regard, any independent input during Section 301’s three 
stages most likely hinges on the participation of government employees who are not 
appointed by the President.174 Other agencies consult with the USTR throughout this, but 
the USTR is the most important agency in these three stages and in reporting to 
Congress.175    
Section 301 powers are broadly delegated to the executive branch and more precisely 
to the USTR. The USTR has the discretion to initiate an investigation and to pursue 
 
164 See id. at 1103. 
165 See Claussen, supra note 163, at 1142. 
166 See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 163, at 588-89. 
167 See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 163, at 588-89. 
168 See Claussen, supra note 163, at 1103 (describing that the president is allowed “to act without any 
supervision when he wishes to set higher tariffs”); Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 163, at 648-49 
(explaining the president’s “significant discretion” for this tariff includes determining the trade remedy, 
which products, from what country, and for how long).  
169 This includes publication in the Federal Register if it does the following: decides whether to initiate an 
investigation, see 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(3)-(4); (b)(1)(A); has reached a determination, see 19 U.S.C. § 
2414(c); or modifies an action, see 19 U.S.C. § 2417(b). It also has to report to Congress, semi-annually, 
regarding Section 301 actions taken with respect to investigations and their commercial effects. 19 U.S.C. § 
2419(3)(C)(D). It is required to consult annually with Congress regarding investigations and trade 
enforcement priorities and actions. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)-(b).  
170 See Trade Act of 1974 §301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411. 
171 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (requiring action regarding practices in violation of a trade agreement); 19 
U.S.C. § 2411(b) (providing the USTR discretion to start action in cases of unreasonable or discriminatory 
trade practices).  
172 See Claussen, supra note 163, at 1128-29. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c)(2)(C); 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1)(B); 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(D). 
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retaliation.176 Under the caption of “Discretionary Action,” the Trade Act specifically states 
that the USTR takes action subject to the President’s “specific direction.”177 USTR actions 
are similarly subject to “all other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the 
President.”178 The USTR can act “within the power of the President” regarding trade in 
goods or services or “any other area pertinent to relations with country.”179 With this, the 
USTR may rely on other executive powers, including foreign relations.  
This discretion is evident in the China Section 301 Case, specifically during the 
exclusion stage. There is no clear requirement for exclusions in the Trade Act. This leaves 
the process “solely at the USTR’s discretion” and unclear as to how it functions internally 
in the USTR.180 With exclusions, American consumers, importers, retailers, and 
manufacturers try desperately to escape executive tariffs. This stage provides the last 
chance to avoid economic harms until the President ends the Section 301 case or a 
negotiation with the foreign country is completed.  
A series of procedural, reporting, and timing requirements guide how the USTR 
advances Section 301 cases. The USTR has to report and consult with Congress in various 
instances.181 It must announce in the Federal Register developments regarding the 
investigation, its determination, and modification or termination of any action.182 Various 
deadlines force the USTR to proceed or report on a case.183 The USTR must consult with 
other agencies and the private sector during the investigation and retaliation phases of 
Section 301 cases.184 While these requirements do keep policy makers and stakeholders 
informed and at times able to provide their perspective, it is difficult for other government 
branches or agencies to stop or significantly change how cases progress.  
Most likely, if the USTR follows the process laid out in the Trade Act and is closely 
driven by Presidential direction, a case will not significantly change course. Kathleen 
Claussen argues that executive tariffs’ statutory structure predisposes the executive branch 
to employ them.185 Put simply, the President and the USTR heavily control the fate of 
Section 301 tariffs, typically until they reach a resolution with the foreign state. Relevant 
to PPE during the pandemic, tariff changes will only happen when the administration is 
satisfied with IP and cyber theft developments in China, ends the investigation, removes 
PPE from retaliation actions against China, or excludes individual PPE goods from the 
tariffs.   
Substantive checks on executive tariffs have been eliminated. For example, the 
legislative veto originally constrained Section 301 actions. When enacted in 1974, the 
 
176 See 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (c). 
177 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b). 
178 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2). 
179 See id. 
180 See SCHWARZENBERG, supra note 118, at 1. 
181 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412 (b)(2)(C), 2413(b)(2)(B), 2417(b), 2420. 
182 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2414(a)(3)(B)(iii), 2412(a)(4), 2412(b)(1)(A), 2412(b)(2)(D) (investigation); 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2414(c) (determination); 19 U.S.C. § 2417(b) (modification or termination of any action).  
183 These include twelve months to conduct an investigation, 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2)(B); 30 days to 
implement retaliations such after a determination has been reached, 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a); four years for 
retaliation, 19 U.S.C. § 2417(c)(1). 
184 See 19 U.S.C. § 2155. 
185 See Claussen, supra note 163, at 1101, 1106. 
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Trade Act permitted Congress to disapprove and stop specific Section 301 actions.186 This 
constituted a legislative veto, an act that overrides a completed executive action.187 In 1983, 
however, the Supreme Court found legislative vetoes to be unconstitutional in I.N.S. v. 
Chadha.188 The Court’s ruling abolished the “most important Congressional restraint” for 
delegations of trade power to the executive, relevant to Section 301 and other executive 
tariffs.189 In the Trade Act, Congress contemplated the legislative veto as an important 
constraint. 
Traditionally, courts have not exercised meaningful checks on executive tariff 
delegations, but recent litigation since the trade war hints at potential changes. Sections 
301, 201, and 232 do not expressly provide for judicial review for executive tariffs.190 Court 
review has usually been precluded, since the President has not been regarded as an agency, 
which is needed for review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).191 The USTR 
is technically within the Executive Office of the President and argued to not be an 
agency.192 Similarly, courts have found that executive tariffs meet delegation requirements 
needed to impose additional duties pursuant to congressional authorization.193 Recent 
attempts to challenge the Court’s delegation findings have failed. In 2019, the United States 
Court of International Trade found that Section 232 tariffs for steel were constitutional 
delegations of Congress’s tariff powers.194  
Legal doctrine may change with the trade war. The Court of International Trade’s 
recent rulings and decisions point to judicial enforcement of the procedural requirements 
for executive tariffs. In one case involving duties for steel products from Turkey, under 
Section 232, the trial court found that retaliatory tariff designations must conform with 
timelines in the statute.195 It described these requirements as constraints on executive 
power. 196 In 2020, a later panel of the court upheld this order, stating that for tariffs, 
presidents must strictly adhere to timeline restrictions.197 In another case regarding tariffs 
on solar products pursuant to Section 201, the court focused on USTR determinations 
during the exclusion process.198 This process is similar to the third stage of Section 301, 
but here it is for Section 201 when the USTR responds to import quantities that harm 
 
186 See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2043 (regarding trade actions for 
countries not part of an investigation); Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade 
Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1191, 1207 n.46 (1986). 
187 Koh defines legislative vetoes as “action with legislative effect but not accomplished through legislation 
and not requiring the President’s signature,” accomplished with a resolution of one house of congress or 
both houses that overrides or alters completed executive action. Id. at 1196 n.16. 
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domestic industry. Importantly, the court found that the USTR is an agency for the 
purposes of the APA, emphasizing how the USTR operates and how it presents itself.199 It 
added that USTR exclusion choices did not conform with Notice-and-Comment 
requirements and were likely arbitrary and capricious.200 Rulings since then agree.201  
The Court of International Trade is expected to rule on a similar case, specifically 
regarding Section 301 tariffs and the APA. In a complaint filed in September of 2020, 
importers focus on procedural problems with tariff retaliations in the China Case.202 They 
argue that later tariff rounds, rounds three and four, are not related to the original purpose 
of the Section 301 investigation of China’s IP and cyber theft practices.203 They also 
contend that these tariff rounds are untimely, since they came twelve months after the 
USTR’s report on China’s unfair trade practices.204 Nearly three thousand importers have 
made similar contentions before the court about the procedural illegalities with Section 301 
tariff retaliations.205 
B.   Section 301 Aggravated the COVID Response. 
Section 301 tariffs significantly impact public health readiness, with racial 
consequences in coronavirus exposure and treatments. As the pandemic persists, Section 
301 remains extremely relevant because China still dominates the PPE market, and the 
trade war shows no sign of ending. Countless Americans need these goods as essential 
workers, patients, first responders, or everyday shoppers. Early in 2020, Section 301 tariffs 
made PPE more expensive and consequently diminished supplies. This aggravated the PPE 
crisis. Shortages resulted in more virus contractions, hospitalizations, and deaths.  
PPE is needed to stop COVID’s community spread. The UC Berkeley Labor Center 
found that in California over 20,000 worker infections could have been avoided with proper 
PPE.206 Recent studies since the pandemic identify reduced COVID contractions when PPE 
is used.207 Thus, the executive choices to tax PPE imports aggravates COVID policies by 
reducing the availability of PPE.  
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Latest Development in Court Case Challenging Validity of Section 301 Tariffs; Opportunity to Add 
Challenge to List 4A to Complaints, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 24, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/latest-development-court-case-challenging-validity-section-301-
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206 William Dow, Kevin Lee & Laurel Lucia, Economic and Health Benefits of a PPE Stockpile, U. CAL. 
BERKELEY LABOR CTR. (Aug. 12, 2020), https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/economic-and-health-benefits-of-
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207 One study reports daily COVID growth rates declining by .9% and 2% in American states where face 
masks were mandated, see Wei Lyu & George L. Wehby, Community Use of Face Masks and COVID-19: 
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Tariffs hurt public health readiness. The USTR deployed Section 301 for an entirely 
different goal: to change IP and cyber theft practices in China. In policy terms, the Trump 
administration weighed the impact of retaliatory tariffs for imports by Americans with the 
goal of ending China’s unfair treatment of American businesses. In this calculation, PPE 
imports are just one set of goods amongst thousands that became more expensive with 
additional tariffs, starting in 2018.208 Section 301 is a part of a larger trade war with China, 
with executive tariffs also imposed on steel, solar panels, and washing machines. All of 
these trade measures are part of larger tensions with China. These tensions include public 
friction over 5G and Huawei, Hong Kong, journalists in the two countries, COVID 
responses, and multilateral tensions in the World Health Organization, South China Sea, 
and World Trade Organization.209 In sum, executive choices to deploy retaliatory tariffs, 
whether in Sections 301, 201, or 232, happened while the administration pursued other 
foreign policy objectives. 
The USTR in the investigation and retaliation stages of the China Case publicly and 
methodologically contemplated economic pressure on China. Section 301 cases cause 
harm to domestic American economic interests.210 Tariff duties are actually paid 
domestically by Americans, and later these impacts, in the form of external economic 
pressure, may force changes in China’s unfair commercial practices.211 With Section 301, 
taxes are charged and paid in the United States whereas changes to Chinese policies are 
the eventual goal but are not certain. In the past, Section 301 cases succeeded when the 
United States had more leverage over the foreign country.212 Past experiences with Section 
301 cases suggest that without sufficient leverage the result can frustrate goals to open 
foreign markets, unpredictability hurting American consumers, and creating negative 
consequences to foreign policy, financial, and national security objectives.213 China is the 
second largest economy in the world and by many measures a superpower, changing 
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leverage calculations.214 As such, the China Case appears to be more focused on rewriting 
legal rules on trade to compete with China versus protecting domestic industries or helping 
Americans who economically suffer from trade.215    
In 2020 it became clear that the Trump administration did not take public health 
warnings as seriously as needed when it failed to assess the blowback effects of its tariffs 
on the global supply chain. Warnings specifically concerned PPE and medical supplies 
from China because China is the largest producer of PPE.216 Supply chains provide these 
products worldwide as opposed to the goods manufactured domestically. Supply chains 
quickly and economically produce and transport PPE.217  Overseas producers formulate 
their manufacturing procedures for international demand.218 For American purchasers, this 
results in PPE of high medical quality, with the overseas production having the required 
American health regulation approvals.219 However, the supply chain system is not flexible. 
It is not easy to source alternative suppliers for PPE. It takes years to find new producers 
or to develop production capacities elsewhere. This is particularly true given China’s large 
share of global PPE production, low labor costs, and manufacturing capabilities approved 
by the FDA for the American market.220  
With these commercial aspects, the USTR failed to recognize the foreseeable 
negative impacts if PPE demand surged. Industry representatives gave their warnings in 
2018 and 2019 during the retaliation and exclusion stages of the China Case.221 Looking 
back, Section 301 tariffs could have been imposed on thousands of imports with PPE not 
included. The public health and emergency significance of PPE, plus tariff charges of up 
to 25%, should have been weighed against the economic pressure directed at China. 
Pandemics are not a surprise. Recent presidencies have had to quickly address virus 
outbreaks, like MERs, H1N1, Ebola, and others.222 Most likely, Trump administration 
officials prioritized putting economic pressure on China, or they did not recognize the 
impact that tariffs would have on American supplies.   
Here, the executive branch did not use its discretionary powers to avoid additional 
tariffs on PPE. It has two ways to avoid these tariffs. The USTR did not eliminate PPE 
from Section 301 tariffs in 2018 or 2019, nor did the President invoke emergency powers 
to allow duty-free imports in 2020. As described, the USTR enjoys wide delegations of 
discretionary influence over the retaliation and exclusion stages.223 As early as 2018, it 
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could have taken PPE off the tariff list for Section 301 retaliation. The USTR and President 
did not use their legal powers to offset the blowback from imposing executive tariffs on 
PPE. 
Moreover, the administration did not use its emergency power to make imports duty-
free. Section 318 of the Tariff Act of 1930 specifically allows the President to eliminate 
import tariffs for designated goods.224 In April 2020, President Trump did invoke Section 
318 to change custom charges for imports. But, this only allowed importers to postpone 
(not suspend) tariff payments, and it explicitly excluded Section 301 duties.225 
The executive similarly did not take the public health impacts of PPE supplies as 
seriously as needed when it planned Section 301 retaliations and exclusions in 2018 and 
2019. Multiple PPE and medical supply producers submitted comments and testified to the 
need for these goods in a public health emergency or epidemic.226 Speaking directly to 
potential inclusion on the tariffs list and then for exclusion requests, they described the 
experience of PPE demand and price surges during recent H1N1 and Ebola epidemics.227  
While the USTR is primarily focused on trade enforcement and economic 
consequences for Americans, the executive branch has multiple agencies and mandates to 
monitor and prepare for situations like COVID.228 These agencies contribute to the Section 
301 intra-agency consultations.229 The Trump administration was not prepared for this kind 
of emergency. These complaints encompass far more than PPE.230 These mishaps from the 
White House add to the mentioned delays in responding to COVID warnings from leading 
aides and cabinet members.231 
C.   Section 301 Can Be Reformed. 
PPE and medical supplies will remain of extreme significance, whether this 
pandemic persists, new ones arise, or trade tensions with China continue. Lawmakers can 
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reform Section 301 to avoid crises similar to the PPE crisis experienced in early 2020.232 
The administration, Congress, and courts have the means to help ensure supply shortages 
are not exacerbated during trade enforcement measures.  
The executive has two ways to offset the harms of additional tariffs deployed in a 
Section 301 case: emergency powers under Section 318 and exclusions from these tariffs. 
One way the executive can combat the economic harms is to implement Section 318 
emergency powers eliminating the additional tariffs enacted pursuant to Section 301. The 
President can pursue Section 301 cases and then in conjunction with this it can invoke 
emergency Section 318 powers when needed. Emergency scenarios can be identified 
before imports are taxed. Already, the USTR complies with various Notice-and-Comment 
requirements while preparing the tariff list and during the exclusion process.233 At these 
stages, the USTR could identify the emergency significance of any goods. Section 318 
allows for importing goods duty-free after declaring an emergency. It specifically lists 
“food, clothing, and medical, surgical, and other supplies.”234 When an emergency like 
COVID develops, or a natural disaster or war, the President can invoke these Section 318 
powers to eliminate tariffs on PPE. These measures are distinct from requests to have 
particular items not included in list for additional tariffs. 
Another way is for the USTR to use its discretion to suspend a good from being 
included on the tariff list.235 Part II of this Article described these exclusions in the China 
Case generally and for PPE more specifically. These two options, Section 318 and 
exclusions, permit the executive branch to retain control of a Section 301 case while 
offsetting the harms of goods being imported with added taxes.  
However, these executive options pose two complications. First, for the USTR to 
invoke emergency powers or modify the tariff list at its own discretion, it would require an 
administration politically invested in the trade enforcement action to, on its own accord, 
decide to pullback or to limit retaliatory tariffs. These levies are part of a larger Section 
301 case. It is unlikely the Trump administration would have done this given the 
importance it placed on the trade war. Second, any of these reliefs, with Section 318 or 
with exclusion from the Section 301 tariff list, would not help supply shortages until after 
goods are imported. As such, relief comes later, perhaps too late for emergency help. PPE 
imports from China, weeks if not months away, exemplify these problems with government 
action having a delayed impact. 
Aside from these examples of executive action, Congress and the courts can help 
avoid these delays and shortages in the future. Congress can reform parts of Section 301. 
Since the China Case, members of Congress proposed bills to have the USTR provide more 
disclosures to Congress about Section 301 actions.236 With new legislation, Congress can 
 
232 This essay suggests a specific reform that helps identify the economic burden of tariffs. This is only 
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require the USTR to provide more information on the tariff list and the exclusion process. 
The China Case has illuminated the lack of clarity involving the procedures for determining 
what products will be subject to additional tariffs, what will be the tariff rate applied to 
these products, and when these levies are applied. Similarly, the China Case has shown a 
lack of clarity in the exclusions process, regarding how the USTR receives these requests 
and reviews them.237   
Another legislative option is for Congress to limit certain economic sectors from 
retaliation measures in Section 301 cases. National security tariffs, also implemented by 
the USTR, have such a provision limiting retaliation for petroleum in Section 232(f).238 A 
similar provision could permit the USTR to make its substantive Section 301 
determinations in stage one, as it does now, but in stage two or three any inclusion of 
medical supplies or PPE would require Congressional approval. The President and the 
USTR would be free to conduct the investigation, but tariff powers delegated by Congress 
would be reserved for sensitive economic sectors.  
Alternatively, Congress could designate another agency such as the USITC, which 
is more independent than the USTR,239 to approve the tariff retaliation list generally or to 
approve the USTR’s inclusion of products with emergency significance. While these 
reforms to Section 301 would not secure PPE or medical equipment supplies, much less 
limit health inequities, they would allow Congress members the opportunity to ask about 
the economic burden of tariffs. If appropriately legislated, Congress could stop or delay 
additional tariffs for certain goods. 
Courts could step in once Section 301 cases are filed to enforce procedural limits on 
USTR actions. The Court of International Trade’s recent rulings on Section 232 and 201 
tariffs point to these potential procedural limitations. Section 232 and 201 have similar 
delegations, structured as executive tariff actions after an agency conducts an investigation 
and makes its determination. So far, recent rulings on these statutes found that the USTR 
is an agency for APA jurisdictional purposes, the USTR and the President must comply 
with procedures and timeline requirements, and Notice-and-Comment procedures limit 
how the USTR makes its exclusion determinations.240 While these are not specific to 
Section 301, they do provide insight into how courts may review the economic harms felt 
domestically from executive tariffs. They also suggest how courts can begin to look at how 
the USTR prioritizes its determination in the retaliation and exclusion stages of Section 
301.  
In sum, Section 301 tariffs are one of many statutory trade enforcement measures 
delegated to the executive branch. With discretion to implement, administer, and decide 
when to end these tariffs, Section 301 insulates presidents from significant checks from 
Congress and the courts. This level of discretion protects executive choices intended to end 
unfair trade practices hurting American commerce overseas. It similarly allows the 
executive branch to designate how domestic businesses and consumers feel the burden of 
additional tariffs. The PPE crisis, experienced in 2020, is one economic example of such a 
burden. As described below, this has racial consequences by limiting PPE needed for 
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communities who are disproportionately exposed to, infected by, and dying because of the 
coronavirus. 
IV. PPE SCARCITY ADDS TO COVID’S RACIAL DISPARITIES. 
PPE scarcity exemplifies how trade policies can have negative socioeconomic 
effects. PPE supply chains function as intended, relying on Chinese production, when 
goods are imported without added duties. This changed significantly with Section 301 
retaliation, the consequential rise in PPE prices, and demand spikes because of COVID. 
Because of this, a PPE buyer, whether a hospital system or an essential worker, faced 
uncertainty in finding crucial items. In commercial terms, this decreased the supply of 
goods needed in a public health emergency. Limited access to PPE prevented important 
protections that would help stop virus spread, enabling individuals to work and support 
themselves and their families.  
PPE scarcity and its detrimental consequences disproportionately impact minority 
communities. Public health and worker advocates explain that PPE is essential for minority 
populations to fight COVID.241 This Part describes the impact that disruptions in PPE 
supplies had on minority communities, provides definitions and a framework, describes 
data regarding populations of color and the pandemic, and suggests how PPE scarcity adds 
to COVID’s racial disparity. This Part also tries to motivate further inquiry. It prompts 
questions as to the relationship between PPE costs and availability, and the resulting 
socioeconomic consequences. The most important consequence of a disruption in PPE 
supplies is a limited capacity to avoid virus contraction. 
The pandemic shines light on “health disparities,” differences closely associated with 
social, economic, and environmental disadvantages, or some combination of all three.242 
These inequalities impact groups with characteristics linked to discrimination such as race, 
gender, socioeconomic status, and immigration. This Article uses the terms “racial 
disparity” or “racial consequences” to show how COVID disproportionately impacts 
minority populations. Racial disparities and racial consequences are examples of health 
disparities or health inequities.243 Racism and discrimination are structural and 
institutional, with organizations or systems continuing race-based exclusions, without 
needing any individual actor to discriminate.244 Specific intent to discriminate is not 
needed, either when administering health services or when the USTR imposes executive 
tariffs on PPE. From a similar perspective, Philip Blumenshine provides a framework to 
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dying-of-covid-191/; FRYE, supra note 20. 
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243 For descriptions of these terms, see id.; see also Bleich, Jarlenski, Bell & LaVeist, supra note 37. 
244 For examples of structural racism and discrimination in health care, see Obasogie, Headen & Mujahid, 
supra note 35, at 316. For the role of structural racism and discrimination in the medical study of diseases, 
see Jones, supra note 35.  
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examine how pandemics impact these communities. The framework identifies three fronts: 
virus exposure, susceptibility to the virus, and treatment for the virus.245  
COVID’s racial disparities stand out clearly in the quantitative data on virus deaths 
and contractions amongst African American, Latino, and other groups.246 These figures are 
continually collected and examined as the pandemic develops with new surges since June 
2020.247 The New York Times reports African American and Latino persons are three times 
more likely to be infected and are nearly twice as likely to die compared to white 
populations.248 These conclusions are based on nationwide CDC records from January until 
the end of May of 2020.249 This time period corresponds to the focus of this Article’s 
analysis of Section 301 tariffs and PPE shortages.  
Multiple sources offer similar assessments, looking at different records and more 
demographic groups. The COVID Racial Data Tracker explains that the virus “aff[ects] 
Blacks, Indigenous, Latinx, and other people of color the most,” and offers figures updated 
regularly and organized by deaths or positive cases, demographic group, and state or 
territory.250 The APM Research Lab reports that compared to whites, the age-adjusted 
mortality rate for African Americans is 3.8 times as high, followed by 3.2 times as high for 
Indigenous persons, 2.6 for Pacific Islanders, 2.5 for Latinos, and 1.5 for Asians.251 
Academic research examining COVID medical treatments in the early months of 2020 
reaches conclusions consistent with these figures.252  
These various sources, medical and quantitative, show that populations of color 
disproportionately experience the contraction of COVID, as well as the illnesses, 
hospitalizations, and deaths associated with it.253 Simultaneous to a PPE crisis, this begins 
to illustrate the significance of protective equipment. In socioeconomic terms, these studies 
indicate when PPE was most needed and when market disruptions had their most 
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significant negative impact. The likely public health consequences were that a 
disproportionate amount of minority groups had less protections from the virus. In sum, 
these studies show COVID’s ultimate disparity and suggest when PPE was most needed.254   
A picture can be drawn of how COVID affects populations of color and when PPE 
could help. Pandemics impact these communities on three fronts: exposure to the virus, 
susceptibility to the virus, and in treating virus-related illness.255 Ruqaiijah Yearby and 
Seema Mohapatra apply this framework to COVID.256 Specifically, for coronavirus, 
exposure relates to employment and housing, susceptibility involves pre-existing health 
conditions, and treatment refers to limited access to medical care. 257 Guided by these 
findings, Yearby and Mohapatra identify COVID’s racial disparities in the CARES Act 
and employment, housing, and health care laws.258 This Article similarly looks at these 
fronts to identify how PPE shortages arguably add to COVID’s disproportionate impacts. 
Minority groups make up a disproportionate number of essential workers.259 
Populations of color need PPE to avoid virus exposure while working in essential and 
frontline jobs.260 With this equipment, workers can prevent virus contraction and further 
infection of others. The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) found that over 
four-in-ten frontline workers are African American, Hispanic, Asian-American/Pacific 
Islander or non-white.261 CEPR describes a series of demographic findings for workers in 
frontline industries nationwide.262 These industries are grocery, convenience, and drug 
stores; public transit; trucking, warehouse, and postal service; building cleaning services; 
health care; and childcare and social services.263 Hispanics are especially overrepresented 
in building cleaning, and African Americans are most overrepresented in childcare and 
social services.264 Workers of color are particularly overrepresented in specific occupations 
in transit, cleaning, health care, childcare, and social services industries.265 Immigrants are 
overrepresented in cleaning services and various frontline industries.266 The Economic 
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Policy Institute finds similar overrepresentations for people of color in food and agriculture 
industries and in industrial, commercial, and residential facilities and services.267 
Specifically, non-white women are overrepresented in frontline industries. The 
Center for American Progress explains that many of the jobs where women of color most 
commonly work are in essential industries. For example, women of color often work as 
nursing assistants, home health aides, and childcare workers.268 They also make up major 
parts of specific occupations such as cashiers, registered nurses, personal care aides, maids, 
and housekeeping cleaners.269 Another study finds that women make up the majority of 
frontline workers, such as 76.8% of health care workers, 85.2% childcare and social 
services workers, and the majority in 24 other frontline occupations.270   
These studies begin to suggest how men and women may contract COVID while 
working in these jobs where PPE is most needed. The UC Berkeley Labor Center found 
that in California over 20,000 worker infections could have been avoided with proper 
PPE.271 Recently, medical researchers found that frontline health care workers had at least 
a threefold increased risk of COVID infection.272 This study added that “Black, Asian, and 
minority ethnic” workers are at “especially high risk” of infection with “at least a fivefold 
increased risk.”273  Specific to equipment shortages, it concluded that both the availability 
of and the quality of PPE reduce the risk of COVID, and reusing PPE or inadequate PPE 
might confer “comparably increased risk.”274  
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News stories describe workers in grocery stores,275 meat processing plants,276 health 
care,277 and agriculture278 catching the virus and dying. Labor and occupational analysis 
shows that health care workers have the greatest risk of virus exposure, while personal care 
and home health aides are quite vulnerable since they work with people most susceptible 
to the coronavirus.279 State-level analysis of confirmed COVID cases reports this risk for 
health care and social assistance workers.280 In some occupations, a large majority of health 
care workers are exposed to disease or infection at least once per week.281 For these 
workers, over 90% are exposed at least once per month.282 Over half of childcare workers, 
nannies, and personal care aides are similarly exposed.283 Labor studies show African 
American workers are “more likely to be essential and more likely to die.”284 Given these 
working conditions, it is no surprise that healthcare, food, nursing home, and sanitation 
workers have gone on strike or threatened to do so, calling for more PPE.285 
Moreover, populations of color are disproportionately susceptible to the virus due to 
pre-existing medical conditions and comorbidities. Health studies of African American 
COVID patients report higher diagnoses of diabetes, hypertension, obesity, chronic kidney 
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disease, heart disease and cerebrovascular disease.286 These underlying conditions 
contribute to minority groups’ higher susceptibility to the virus and higher rates of 
mortality.287 Public concern about the virus reflects these consequences. The Pew Research 
Center reports that one in four African American adults said that they personally know 
someone who has been hospitalized or died from COVID, roughly double the share 
reported by Hispanic or white adults.288 Hispanic adults express greater concern about 
contracting the virus, as well as about unknowingly spreading it.289 
Disparity in virus treatment occurs with less access to medical resources needed to 
prevent, detect, and treat COVID cases. Shortages in PPE needed to stop infections is one 
of many structural factors making these communities more vulnerable. Put simply, fewer 
hospitals, limited insurance, and reduced number of health services are all examples of how 
limited medical resources characterize health inequity.290 These are products of systemic 
racism.291 They suggest why colorblind responses to COVID will not work.292 These 
contexts cannot be easily changed or avoided now that a pandemic exists. For example, 
many people of color could not work from home in March when a national health 
emergency was declared.293  
There are many examples of how the health care system provides limited medical 
attention to these communities. The most direct way this happens is when health care 
workers ignore or dismiss patients, either because they are from minority groups or because 
of their social class.294 Likewise, economic and structural forces exert their influence when 
hospitals are closed in minority communities.295 This presents a compound set of problems, 
with the elimination of care and then overburdening of any remaining medical care.296 
These health disparities reflect long-term discrimination that existed before and will likely 
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persist after the current pandemic.297 Gregorio Millett describes COVID’s racial disparities 
as reflecting similar patterns with HIV, air pollution, cancer, and low birthrates.298 
In sum, empirical studies illustrate how COVID disproportionately impacts Black, 
Indigenous, and People of Color populations. Quantitative data analysis shows that these 
communities have higher rates of virus contractions and COVID deaths.299 Medical 
research confirms these higher rates by examining diagnoses, hospitalization, and mortality 
trends among people of color.300 Demographic and labor analysis illustrate that minority 
groups, immigrants, and non-white women are overrepresented in essential and frontline 
jobs.301 This research into the healthcare system helps identify racial disparities in the 
pandemic. 
All of this data suggests that these communities need PPE to avoid COVID and to 
continue working. It is logical to see PPE shortages or price rises as disproportionately 
impacting populations of color in terms of virus exposure, disease susceptibility, and 
COVID treatment. At this time, data needs to be gathered regarding the effect of PPE prices 
and supplies on equipment used by those with COVID and by essential and frontline 
workers. However, even without such data, Doctor Camara Phyllis Jones suggests how to 
examine race and health: investigate the basis of race-associated differences in health 
outcomes; acknowledge the relationship between race and social class, perpetuated by 
racism; and identify the present-day impacts of racism.302 Following this lead, the empirical 
studies mentioned along with the PPE crisis indicate that PPE shortages exemplify the 
socioeconomic effects of trade policies and add to racial disparities in public health. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the pandemic hit the United States early in 2020, the need for PPE heightened, 
just as inventories of face masks, gloves, and other items were increasingly scarce. An 
existing trade war with China, a major supplier of these goods, aggravated this PPE crisis. 
Since 2018, Section 301 tariffs have taxed PPE imports with additional duties of 7.5% to 
25%.303 These added costs are paid by domestic importers and passed on to American 
consumers.304 By 2020, tariffs resulted in increased prices and decreased imports for PPE 
and medical supplies.305 The increase in PPE prices, for consumers and health 
professionals, exemplifies the socioeconomic impacts of trade policies. It also 
disproportionately impacts populations of color because they make up the majority of 
essential workers and COVID cases and deaths. 
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This Article analyzes America’s response to COVID-19 and the resulting PPE crisis 
from legal, policy, and race-and-health perspectives. First, trade statutes provide the 
executive branch expansive authority to increase tariffs. From this authority, the USTR can 
impose Section 301 tariffs without significant checks from Congress or the courts.306 In the 
China Case, tariffs were meant to compel changes in China’s IP and cyber theft practices. 
American PPE inventories during COVID-19 were just one casualty of this trade war. 
Second, with Section 301 the Trump administration prioritized tariffs over public health 
readiness. For instance, the USTR did not remove PPE and medical equipment from 
Section 301 tariff lists in 2018, did not approve various exclusions in 2019, and told 
Congress that it prefers tariffs for PPE in 2020.307 In this context, tariffs impacted how 
Americans lived through and worked during a pandemic. 
Third, the trade war disproportionately impacts African Americans, Latinos, women, 
and other groups. Limited PPE fuels virus exposure, with populations of color and non-
white women overrepresented in essential and frontline jobs.308 Similar disparities exist 
with susceptibility to the virus and limited health care resources in these communities. 
These racial consequences are evidenced by quantitative studies and medical research on 
COVID infections, hospitalizations and deaths; 309 demographic and occupational analysis 
of essential workers; 310 and critical health scholarship.311 Taken together, they paint a 
picture of how racial disparity afflicts the American COVID response. PPE scarcity or 
spikes in PPE prices logically add to these inequities.  
This Article argues for reforms to Section 301 and proposals in Congress to increase 
PPE inventories and address COVID’s racial disparities.312 Similarly, the administration 
could permit future PPE and medical imports to enter tariff-free, using its powers in Section 
318.313 If implemented, all of these suggestions would help, but not quickly enough if there 
is a pressing need for PPE. This is worrisome on trade and public health fronts. The trade 
war with China shows no sign of abating. This keeps tariffs as the administration’s default 
option. With COVID surges continuing, Americans will need PPE and medical supplies 
from China. Tariffs will fuel a second PPE crisis. Already, PPE shortages look likely well 
into 2021.314 Since August 2020, the FDA and General Accounting Office have issued 
reports on PPE shortages.315 With the latest virus surges in the fall of 2020 and winter of 
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2020-2021, new headlines tell the story of continued PPE scarcity.316 For the Biden 
administration, the immediate lessons are: take prior PPE supply warnings seriously in 
order to limit virus spread and COVID deaths; and certain trade policies, like the China 
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